When assessing an application for international protection, it is necessary to examine whether there are reasonable grounds to fear that the minor’s conduct will be perceived by the ruling regime in their country of origin as an act of political dissent, against which this regime may apply reprisals

On 26th April 2026, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic, by its judgment Case No. 6Sak/3/2026, amended the judgment of the Administrative Court in Košice (hereinafter referred to as the “Administrative Court”) in such a way that it annulled the decision of the Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the “Migration Office”) in the part concerning the non-granting of asylum to a minor applicant from Afghanistan and remitted the case to it for further proceedings. The Supreme Administrative Court considered it necessary to consider all circumstances of potential persecution in the country of origin and emphasized that if the applicant is an unaccompanied minor, they are a particularly vulnerable person.

The minor applicant from Afghanistan entered the territory of the Slovak Republic illegally and was detained upon his arrival. He applied for asylum or the provision of subsidiary protection in the territory of the Slovak Republic due to a fear for his life from the Taliban movement. He argued that his father had been a soldier, the Taliban movement had killed him and threatened his family. The minor also pointed out the recruitment of children and young single men into the ranks of the Taliban, whereby they are taken away from their families under the threat of violence and subsequently taught to use weapons and fight, which he wanted to escape by fleeing Afghanistan. The Migration Office did not grant asylum to the minor; it only provided him with subsidiary protection.

The minor filed an administrative action at the Administrative Court, arguing, among other things, the benefit of the doubt rule, according to which, in case of doubts regarding the assessment of whether the conditions for granting asylum are met, the decision should be made in favour of the asylum seeker. The Administrative Court dismissed the minor’s complaint because it did not consider it duly proven that the minor would face persecution upon returning home, and it did not consider the mere existence of general military conscription to constitute persecution.

The Supreme Administrative Court, on the basis of the minor’s cassation complaint, reviewed the judgment of the Administrative Court and concluded that the grounds of complaint were well-founded. The cassation court considered the fact that an unaccompanied minor was applying for asylum to be extraordinary. His extreme vulnerability is a decisive circumstance and outweighs considerations regarding the status of an illegal immigrant. The cassation court also highlighted the principle of the best interests of the child, which must be perceived both in a procedural and substantive context—for instance, regarding the fulfillment of the conceptual elements of persecution, or proving a well-founded fear of persecution, which can be considered one of the key factors in connection with granting asylum. Children rarely leave their country of origin on their own; usually, they are sent from their country of origin by their parents, and if there is reason to believe that the parents wish for their child to leave the country of origin due to their own well-founded fear of persecution, it can be assumed that the child themselves shares such a fear. If the parents’ will cannot be ascertained, or if there are doubts about it, the well-foundedness of the child’s fear must be decided based on all known circumstances. If a well-founded fear of persecution of the parents can be imputed to children, then the situation where the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution can be presumed directly in the child must be examined with particular sensitivity. On the other hand, it must be stated that the mere circumstance that the asylum seeker is a minor (moreover, unaccompanied) does not automatically, without more, constitute a ground for granting asylum.

According to the cassation court, it is necessary to examine whether there are reasonable grounds to fear that the minor’s conduct will be perceived by the ruling regime in their country of origin as an act of political dissent, against which this regime may apply reprisals. The cassation court emphasized that by fleeing his country of origin, the minor clearly demonstrated his disagreement with the practices of the Taliban movement, thereby expressing a clear dissent against the regime and its practices, and it cannot be ruled out that the Taliban movement would impute a political aspect to his conduct. It also cannot be ruled out that he would be subjected to persecution upon returning to his country of origin.

According to the cassation court, neither the Migration Office nor the respondent Administrative Court further explained the question of persecution in the context of the Act on Asylum, according to which the term “persecution” means acts which are sufficiently serious or repetitive to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, or an accumulation of various measures which affects an individual in a similar manner, which also includes acts directed against children, provided that the very question of severity must also be perceived in the light of the aforementioned baselines concerning unaccompanied minors who are concurrently seeking asylum. Likewise, it is not sufficiently clear on the basis of what facts the Migration Office and the Administrative Court concluded that the minor cannot be considered a member of a particular social group (recruited single minor boys).

The cassation court therefore annulled the decision of the Migration Office in the part concerning the non-granting of asylum and remitted the case to it for further proceedings. The Migration Office shall examine and properly substantiate the questions regarding the existence of the risk of persecution of the minor, who by his flight expressed his refusal to serve in the Taliban movement, information on recruitment by the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, and shall address the question of whether the minor can be considered a member of a social group.

No appeal is admissible against this judgment. The panel of the cassation court decided unanimously.

The decision was rendered by Panel No. 6 of the Supreme Administrative Court, composed of: the President of the Panel, JUDr. Viola Takáčová, PhD., LL.M., and Panel members, JUDr. Martin Tiso (Judge-rapporteur ) and JUDr. Michal Matulník, PhD.