Bailiff Soňa Stodolová is exempt from the disciplinary motion

According to the petitioner, the disciplinary defendant should have breached her duty in 2020 by failing to issue an execution order for execution by deduction from wages in the execution proceedings after she had been served with the order of the execution court (Piešt’any District Court), in accordance with the provisions of the Execution Procedure Code (in force until 31 March 2017), thereby causing delays in the proceedings.

However, in her opinion, the disciplinary defendant stated that “she was not obliged to issue an enforcement order, as alleged by the complainant, on the grounds that the enforcement court was of the opinion that the enforcement proceedings had ceased pursuant to the Act on the termination of certain enforcement proceedings (Act No. 233/2019 Coll.).” During the oral hearing held at the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic on 23 June 2022, her counsel pointed out that in the summer of 2020, the execution court, prior to the delivery of the finality clause, had invited the bailiff to issue a notice of discontinuance of the old execution. It was therefore the bailiff’s task to decide which course of action to take in the present case. He also drew attention to the inconsistent view of the procedure for the discontinuance of old executions, both in the procedure of the execution courts and in the interpretation of the various statutory provisions, both by the bailiffs and by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic.

The decision of the Disciplinary panel 33D states that the complainant derived the act for which she filed the disciplinary motion from the fact that on 12 June 2020 the disciplinary defendant was served with the final clause to the order of the execution court on the sentences I, II and III, which rejected the beneficiary’s objections. According to the Minister of Justice of the Slovak Republic, in accordance with the Execution Rules, the disciplinary defendant should have issued an enforcement order in the case without delay. The bailiff does not dispute that factual conclusion, nor the general obligation to issue an enforcement order after the rejection of the objections, but points to other factual and legal circumstances which, in her opinion, did not allow her to issue an enforcement order after the receipt of that clause.

The Supreme Administrative Court considered the above argument of the disciplinary defendant to be relevant and examined it further in the context of the disciplinary liability against the disciplinary defendant, since the legal regulation of enforcement proceedings after the entry into force of the Act on the termination of certain enforcement proceedings on 1 January 2020 has given rise to many debates and question marks in the application practice.

According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the disciplinary defendant assessed the situation correctly in law, as she was aware that by issuing an enforcement order, she could cause damage to a legally protected interest by unjustified execution on the property of the debtor, due to a contradiction with the legal opinion of the enforcement court (and ambiguity in the application of the provisions of the Act on the termination of certain enforcement proceedings). On the other hand, if it had acted on the basis of the instructions of the execution court and issued a notice of discontinuance of the old execution, it would have acted contrary to the law, which was finally confirmed by the execution court itself. It would thus have interfered with another legally protected interest, namely the interest in the satisfaction of the entire claim of the creditor.

The Supreme Administrative Court is of the opinion that the disciplinary defendant was not guilty of misconduct when, by her repeated enquiries, she urged the enforcement court to issue a decision on the application for stay of execution. In view of the specific circumstances of the enforcement proceedings under review, the disciplinary panel considers that the defendant acted responsibly, with due care, in an effort to avoid delays in the proceedings and prejudice to other legally protected rights. In its decision, the Disciplinary panel adds that the bailiff acted with a degree of caution to avoid unjustified interference with the interests protected by the Enforcement Code, which cannot be regarded as culpable conduct and therefore as a disciplinary offence.

In the light of the factual and legal grounds set out in the decision, the Disciplinary panel acquitted the accused bailiff pursuant to Article 34(2)(b) of the Disciplinary Procedure Code, since the act referred to in the disciplinary complaint does not constitute a disciplinary offence.

The disciplinary case was decided by the Panel 33D of the Supreme Administrative Court, composed of: the President of the Panel JUDr. Viola Takáčová, PhD., the Judges Mgr. Kristína Babiaková (Judge-rapporteur), Prof. JUDr. Peter Potásch, PhD. and lay judges JUDr. Martin Píry and JUDr. Tomáš Vranovič.