The method of disclosing documents not covered by the period 1939-1989 is not regulated by the National Memory Act, but by the Freedom of Information Act

On October 29, 2025, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic, by judgment case file no. 2Svk/27/2024, dismissed the cassation complaint against the annulling judgment of the Administrative Court in Bratislava in the matter of non-disclosure of a document from 1992 held by the Institute of National Memory. The Court of Cassation concluded that the National Memory Act regulates the disclosure and publication of documents dating from 1939 to 1989. The disclosure of documents originating from other time periods and held by the Institute of National Memory is subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

The applicant, in a request under the Freedom of Information Act, requested the Institute of National Remembrance (hereinafter referred to as the “ÚPN”) to disclose a document created on 30 October 1992 by the then intelligence service, with which he could defend himself against the unauthorized registration of his person in the registration protocols of the State Security. The ÚPN did not disclose the document. They stated that it was a document forming an integral part of a volume, or rather a registry record of an intelligence nature. According to the ÚPN, documents of this nature held by the ÚPN may only be disclosed and published under the regime of the National Remembrance Act. This Act cannot be circumvented through the Freedom of Information Act. The applicant filed an administrative action against the decisions of the ÚPN, which the Administrative Court in Bratislava upheld, annulled the decisions of the ÚPN and returned the case to it for further proceedings.

The Court of Cassation, based on the cassation complaint of ÚPN, assessed the correctness of the legal conclusions of the Administrative Court in Bratislava. It emphasized that it is already clear from the time of creation and the originator of the requested document that this document does not meet the legal definition of a security component under the National Memory Act and is therefore not subject to the regulation of disclosure under this regulation. The mere fact that the requested document was submitted to the ÚPN by other authorities of the Slovak Republic as a document on the activities of security components, according to the Court of Cassation, does not mean that such a document must be disclosed only under the National Memory Act.

Since the issue of disclosing the requested document is not regulated or excluded by the National Memory Act, the Court of Cassation also believes that it is necessary to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. According to the Court of Cassation, the case in question does not involve disclosing information that would be subject to legal restrictions, because it does not follow from any provision of the National Memory Act or the Freedom of Information Act that disclosing the requested document would not be permissible.

According to the Court of Cassation, it is true that the Freedom of Information Act does not exhaustively regulate all eventualities of the right to information, nor the obligations of public authorities. In relation to other laws, it acts as a legal regulation of a general nature, and special laws derogate from its application to the extent that they regulate the disclosure and publication of information. However, the Court of Cassation also holds the opinion that if the disclosure of the requested document is not specifically regulated in the National Memory Act, the National Memory Act does not directly or indirectly exclude the application of the Freedom of Information Act, and the procedure for its disclosure is fully regulated by the Freedom of Information Act.

Moreover, the Court of Cassation also pointed out that the case law of the Court of Cassation has basically settled on the view that a person who is entitled to information under a special regulation is not deprived by the Freedom of Information Act of the possibility of using its legal regime with the advantages or disadvantages that arise from it. The relationship between the Freedom of Information Act and other special regulations is therefore complementary, not exclusive. One possible way of obtaining information does not therefore exclude the use of the other.

The judgment was adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court unanimously, and no appeal is admissible against it.

The decision was made by Panel No. 2 of the Supreme Administrative Court, composed of: President of the Panel Prof. JUDr. Juraj Vačok, PhD. (judge rapporteur), judges JUDr. Elena Berthotyová, PhD. and JUDr. Marián Trenčan.