The Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic ruled in the oldest case it took over from the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic

The plaintiff (originally the claimant) sought protection against unlawful interference by a public authority by his application, delivered to the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic on 8 January 2014.

In the petition, he requested the court to give judgment as follows:

1. The court shall prohibit the defendant public authority, the Financial Administration Criminal Office, from requesting information about the plaintiff from the banks.
2. The court shall order the defendant public authority, the Financial Administration Criminal Office, to destroy all information about the plaintiff obtained from the banks within three days of the entry of this judgment.
3. The Court shall order the defendant public authority, the Financial Administration Criminal Office, to notify in writing all the entities to which it has provided information obtained from the banks about the applicant that the information was obtained in an unlawful manner and that it may not therefore be used within the scope of its competence, within three days of the entry into force of this judgment.
4. The Court orders the defendant public authority, the Financial Administation Criminal Office, to notify the banks from which it has requested information about the plaintiff that its requests for information constituted unlawful interference by a public authority, with the proviso that, if the bank has not yet provided the information (even in part), there is no further need to provide it, within three days of the judgment becoming final
5. The Court orders the defendant public authority, the Financial Administration Criminal Office, to disclose any file relating to the plaintiff on the basis of which it requests the banks to provide information on the plaintiff, within three days of the entry into force of this judgment.
6. The Court shall prohibit the defendant public authority, the Financial Administration Criminal Office, from disseminating information that the plaintiff is suspected of having committed a customs offence.

In his application, the plaintiff stated, inter alia, that he was aware of the defendant’s submission by which the Financial Administration Criminal Office required banks under the Customs Act to cooperate by filing complete reports on the plaintiff, in particular statements of his bank accounts (all credit debit information) indicating who has access to electronic banking, whether the plaintiff has a safe deposit box, what securities the plaintiff trades in. In the submission, the defendant also requested from the banks a summary of credit and debit card transactions and a further range of information for the period since its inception. it is clear from the defendant’s submission, according to the plaintiff, that the defendant is not seeking to issue this order in the context of a criminal proceeding, but as a governmental authority under the customs act. The plaintiff further argued that it had simultaneously become aware of an audio recording in which an employee of the Financial Administration Criminal Office stated to an editor of the Radio and Television of Slovakia that the plaintiff (the applicant) was ‘suspected of committing a customs offence’. The plaintiff considered the conduct described to be unlawful interference by a public authority.

The plaintiff justified the fact that the requests by the public authority for information on the plaintiff from the banks constituted unlawful interference on the ground that they did not constitute the proper exercise of the administration of a public authority. The plaintiff argued that it had never imported any goods subject to customs supervision and that, therefore, in its view, the defendant’s jurisdiction was not given under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act and that it was an abuse of the power of a public authority on the part of the defendant.

The Financial Administration Criminal Office made a statement of defence in which it sought the dismissal of the action as unfounded. The defendant stated that it had sent requests for cooperation addressed to banks and branches of foreign banks operating in the territory of the Slovak Republic, requesting information on the plaintiff and his potential bank accounts. However, according to the defendant, the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant requested the information only on the basis of the Customs Act is not true – according to the defendant, the plaintiff purposely narrowed the defendant’s legitimate lawful procedure. The plaintiff’s argument that it had never imported any goods and therefore there could be no suspicion of a customs offence was, according to the defendant, irrelevant, since the purpose of the requested cooperation with the banks was reduced by the plaintiff’s argument to the factual dimension of the customs offence. As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the interference, the defendant added that it had a statutory competence to detect infringements of tax and customs legislation

In the case under review, Panel No. 4 assessed, as a matter of priority, whether the individual features which constitute unlawful interference as defined in the provisions of Section 252 of the Administrative Procedure Code had been fulfilled, i.e. whether the action concerned an action in which a natural or legal person (the plaintiff) could have been deprived of his or her rights, or, as the case may be, whether the plaintiff had been deprived of his or her rights in the proceedings before the Court. The plaintiff may have been deprived of his or her rights and legally protected interests, whether it is an unlawful interference by a public administration body, whether the interference is not a decision, whether the interference was aimed directly against a natural or legal person, whether the consequences last or are likely to recur, whether the plaintiff has exhausted the remedies provided for by a special regulation and whether the application was lodged within the statutory time-limits.

The Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic assessed the plaintiff’s action in the light of the above-mentioned defining characteristics of unlawful interference and concluded that it could not be upheld. Referring to the wording of the petition as defined in the action, the Court found that the action thus proposed could not be subsumed under ‘other interference’ by a public authority.

In that connection, the Panel pointed out that the statement of claim (the petition) is the fulfilment of a specific requirement of an action, which must make it clear what the plaintiff seeks and what it seeks to achieve. The plaintiff is required to state clearly, concisely and precisely what it wants from the court and, therefore, the statement of claim must be precise. By the statement of claim, the plaintiff precisely formulates his claims against the defendant in such a way that the subject-matter of the proceedings is clearly delimited by the court, and may not, as a matter of principle, go beyond it. In the present context, Panel No 4 also referred to the wording of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (Case No. I.ÚS 233/97).

The Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic concluded that the plaintiff’s petition did not meet these conditions, since its individual points were formulated in a general, vague and unworkable manner. In particular, it submits that some of the applicant’s sub-petitions are abstract, non-specific and exhibit such a degree of generality that the court could not rule on them in the manner proposed, as that would go beyond the scope of deciding the facts of the case before it.

In view of the fact that the plaintiff, in formulating his petition, did not indicate a degree of specificity which would enable it to be enforceable, the action had to be dismissed.

The action was decided unanimously by Panel No. 4 of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic, composed of: the President of the Panel, JUDr. Monika Valašiková, PhD., LL.M.; the Judges, JUDr. Zuzana Mališová; prof. JUDr. Peter Potásch, PhD.