An internal regulation issued by a body performing inspection, supervision or oversight may be subject to protection from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
Legal principle stated by the Court:
The phrase relates to inspection, supervision, or oversight by a public authority” within the meaning of Section 11(1)(h) of Act No. 211/2000 Coll. on Free Access to Information must be interpreted restrictively.
However, it cannot be ruled out that an internal regulation (whether general or specific) issued by a body performing inspection, supervision, or oversight—or a part thereof—may be subject to protection from disclosure pursuant to Section 11(1)(h) of the aforementioned Act. This will be the case, however, only if disclosure could thwart or substantially impede the inspection, supervision, or oversight.
In a decision to refuse the disclosure of information on this ground, the threat of thwarting the purpose of the inspection, supervision or oversight as a protected public interest must be clearly identified and thoroughly justified with reference to the specific circumstances of the case. The decision should also include a balancing test and a reviewable reasoning as to why the public interest in protecting the inspection, supervision or oversight outweighs the applicant’s right to information.
On May 21, 2026, the Panel of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic, in its judgment Case No. 1Svk/17/2026, dismissed the cassation complaint against the judgment of the Administrative Court in Bratislava (hereinafter referred to as the “Administrative Court”) in proceedings to review the legality of a decision by the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the “PMÚ”), which denied a request for access to an internal regulation under the Freedom of Information Act. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the request for information, even though it concerns an internal regulation relating to inspection activities, must be carefully assessed, and the decision to withhold the information must be justified, including with regard to whether disclosure of the information could thwart or substantially impede inspection (or supervision or oversight).
The entrepreneur’s legal representative requested that the PMÚ disclose an internal regulation governing the PMÚ’s procedure for investigating the breach of an official seal securing documents, data storage media, or PMÚ premises where an investigation of seized information and documents was conducted pursuant to Section 17( 4 of the Act on the Protection of Competition (hereinafter referred to as a “security incident”), as well as information regarding the subsequent handling, examination, and transfer of the seized information and documents following the occurrence of the security incident. The PMÚ did not grant the request and did not disclose the requested information. It justified the refusal on the grounds that the information relates to the exercise of supervisory authority pursuant to Section 1(1) of Act No. 187/ 2021 Coll. on the Protection of Competition and, pursuant to Section 11(1)(h) of the Freedom of Information Act in conjunction with Section 56(4) of the Act on the Protection of Competition, falls under the restriction on access to information. The PMÚ stated that the requested information concerned the PMÚ’s procedure in investigating a so-called security incident that allegedly occurred during the review of documents and information obtained during an inspection at the business operator’s premises. These documents were also obtained during an inspection conducted as part of the PMÚ’s investigation and were related to suspected anticompetitive conduct by several entities, including the business that requested the information. The business owner argued that he had not requested information regarding a specific proceeding, but rather general information about the PMÚ’s procedures, which did not constitute the exercise of the PMÚ’s powers under the Act on the Protection of Competition.
The Administrative Court overturned the PMÚ’s decision and remanded the case to the PMÚ for further proceedings on the grounds of an incorrect legal assessment of the matter. The Administrative Court found that the PMÚ was required to assess the entrepreneur’s request solely in the context of its content—that is, that the entrepreneur had requested information of an internal nature without linking this information to any specific inspection or entity under investigation.
The PMÚ filed a cassation complaint against the Administrative Court’s judgment.
In the course of the cassation proceedings, The Cassation Court reviewed the internal regulation in question—which was a directive from the PMÚ chairman—and concluded that it constituted an individual administrative act that assigned one-time tasks to specific employees in connection with the investigation of a specific incident involving the damage to an official seal, which occurred during an ongoing investigation under the Competition Act on the entrepreneur’s premises. However, the entrepreneur requested access to an internal PMÚ regulation governing the investigation of (any, unspecified) security incident—i.e., a general or normative regulation that governs in detail the various areas of the Office’s activities and establishes binding rules for the resolution and performance of recurring activities without time limitations.
The Cassation Court concurred with the administrative court’s conclusion that the PMÚ itself had incorrectly linked the subject matter of the request to a specific security incident. According to the Cassation Court, it was clear from the subject matter of the request that the entrepreneur was requesting access to information as “anyone,” i.e., as any other requester—a natural or legal person—under the Act on Free Access to Information; therefore, his procedural status in other proceedings or in supervision conducted by the Office was irrelevant.
The Cassation Court held that if the PMÚ refused to provide the requested information, it should have stated the reasons for withholding it; and if the PMÚ had doubts as to which information the request concerned, it was obligated to promptly ask the requester to supplement the request. However, it did not proceed in this manner and instead determined the subject matter of the proceedings on its own, speculating on the content of the requested information.
The Cassation Court also took a position on the application of Section 11(1)(h) of the Act on Free Access to Information and, unlike the administrative court, reached a conclusion consistent with the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, namely that, on this basis, access to information from a concluded inspection may also be restricted. The Cassation Court agrees with the conclusion that the term “relates to inspection, supervision, or oversight by a public authority” must be interpreted restrictively. However, it cannot be ruled out that even an internal regulation (whether general or individual) issued by an authority conducting a inspection, supervision, or oversight—or a part thereof—may be protected from disclosure under Section 11(1)(h) of the Act on Free Access to Information. This will be the case, however, only if disclosure could thwart or substantially impede the inspection, supervision, or oversight.
According to The Cassation Court, an obligated entity that intends to refuse disclosure of an internal regulation on the grounds specified in Section 11(1)(h) of the Freedom of Information Act must carefully assess whether its disclosure could thwart or substantially impede inspection, and the decision to withhold the information must then clearly identify the threat of thwarting the purpose of inspection as a protected public interest and thoroughly justify it by referring to the specific circumstances of the case, so that this conclusion is subject to review by an administrative court. The decision of the obligated party should also include a balanced and reviewable assessment of why the public interest in protecting the exercise of inspection (or supervision or oversight) outweighs the applicant’s right to information.
However, according to the Cassation Court, the objections raised by the PMÚ in its cassation complaint were not sufficient to call into question the factual correctness of the contested judgment of the administrative court. For this reason, the Cassation Court dismissed the PMÚ’s cassation complaint as unfounded pursuant to Section 461 of the Administrative Court Code.
This decision was adopted unanimously by the Panel of the Supreme Administrative Court, and no further appeal is admissible against it.
The decision was rendered by Panel No. 1 of the Supreme Administrative Court, composed of: the President of the Panel JUDr. Jana Hatalová, PhD., LL.M., and Panel Members JUDr. Katarína Cangárová, PhD., LL.M. (Judge-rapporteur) and JUDr. Marián Fečík.